Sunday, October 23, 2016

Questions about “Babushka security” and tons of answers, all of them wrong

I just watched a video for a neighbor of Motorola who explains that Motorola had no real protection, that it was easy to enter his building, that it was easy to enter into the elevator shaft and place a bomb there.  As for using a remotely controlled device, it was easy to build even for amateurs.  Bottom line: even poorly trained amateurs could have killed Motorola.


Okay, the first time around I did not bother to go into details about all this, but since clearly there are a lot of people who don’t see the elephant in the room, I will have to explain a couple of things.

First, how is security done?
The first level of security is intelligence.  You monitor all those who could conduct a terrorist attack.  You also infiltrate your agents in their networks to be informed of what they are up to.  In our case, both the Novorussians and the Russians failed to do that.  How do I know that?  Motorola is dead.
The second level of security is counter-intelligence.  You specifically monitor and try to smoke out those in the territory under your responsibility who might want to collaborate with the enemy.

These two first levels are invisible and to not involved the actual protection of facilities or persons.
I will readily admit that the Novorussian MGB (state security) might not have enough agents and contacts in the SBU and Ukie death squads to be capable of doing this kind of counter-terrorism work.  But the Russians?  The SVR, the GRU and even the FSB probably have eyes and ears everywhere in the Ukraine, for them it’s “home turf” and they have all the contacts for that.  And to those who would say “well, maybe they don’t” I will simply reply that if they don’t, then Putin ought to fire all the heads of the SVR, GRU and FSB and replace them by competent people.  But, of course, I am sure that they do have such capabilities, along with world-class signal intelligence, communication interception, etc.

The third level of protection is area protection.  The DNR MBG should have had eyes and ears in the neighborhood and building where Motorola lived.  Well, let me rephrase that – Motorola had not business living in a “regular” building to being with.  He should have been moved to a secured facility.  But IF he was outside, even visiting his friends or relatives, this entire neighborhood and building should have been monitored.  At the very least, the entrance of Motorola’s building and all the floors above should have been secured.  All this could have been done inconspicuously or visibly, that does not really matter. For example, his neighbors should have been warned about the risks and paid to immediately call an emergency if anything suspicious – like elevator repairs – was taking place.  Even children playing in the yard can be very effective “alarm systems”.  What does matter is that all of the above steps are standard operating procedures for any official living in a zone of potential terrorist activity.

Some of those who lived near Morotola are now blaming those who like me ask questions for “spreading crazy rumors” and “making up stories” while having no understanding of the reality of Donetsk.  They say that we don’t have proof of our allegations.  But, of course, we have.  Not only is Motorola dead, but everybody admits that he had zero protection!  What other evidence is needed to speak of gross incompetence and criminal negligence?
If those who say that all the SBU had to do is hand over some explosives and a wad of cash to a local person to set this bomb and murder Motorola are correct, then the bottom line is painfully obvious:

The DNR authorities are clearly not capable of protecting their own leaders
Those who go to great lengths and explain in great detail why Motorola was such an easy target apparently don’t realize that they make my case stronger since, by their own admission, Motorola was not protected.  And that is the real disgrace, not asking questions about his death!

Only a series of failures could have made it possible for the Ukrainians to murder Motorola: a failure in intelligence work, followed by another failure of counter-intelligence work, following by a criminally negligent attitude towards the protection of officials.  And yet – did anybody get fired? demoted? even gently admonished?  Nope!  Are any of the neighbors of Motorola now loudly demanding that those who made this murder possible be identified and punished?  Nope!  How about all the other cases when senior Novorussian figures were murderd, was anybody held accountable?  Were procedures changed?  Did investigations reveal the many systemic flaws with resulted in such a lax security?  No, of course not.
If that had been done, Motorola would still be alive today.
So it that simple, really.  If the Novorussians can’t get the job done, then the Russians need to come in, take over, and train the locals.  I for sure don’t want to hear that Givi or Zakharchenko were killed next due to the failures of “Babushka security”.  That is why I ask questions and will continue to ask questions: because I want things to change.  Those who don’t want questions asked are basically voting for more of the same, whether the understand that or not.
The Saker

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